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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS

Optional Clause and the extremely broad reservations contained in India's Optional Clause
declaration, it is unlikely that the Court will be able to entertain any dispute involving that
country, whether as applicant or as respondent, based on the Optional Clause.
PETER H. F. BEKKER
White & Case LLP, New York

Prompt release of vessels and crews-exhaustion of local remedies-4is pendens-amount andform
of reasonablebond-UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
THE "CAMouco" (PANAMAV. FRANCE) (JUDGMENT).

ITLOS Case No. 5. <http://www.un.org/
Dept/los/ITLOS/JudgmentCamouco.htm>.
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, February 7, 2000.

On January 17, 2000, pursuant to Article 292 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea' (Convention), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Tribunal)
was asked to order the prompt release of a fishing vessel and its master arrested by France

for fishing violations in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).2 The application, filed on behalf
of Panama, challenged the decision of the French courts requiring that, to secure release
of the vessel, a bond of twenty million French francs be posted in cash or by certified check

or bank draft. A hearing was held on January 27 and 28. On February 7, by a vote of 19 to
2, 4 the Tribunal ordered France to release the vessel and its master promptly upon receipt
of a bond in the form of a bank guarantee. By 15 votes to 6, 5 the Tribunal fixed the amount
of the bond at eight million French francs.6 The bond was posted, and the French courts
released the vessel and its master in late March.7

The Camouco, a long-lining quick-freeze fishing vessel flying the Panamanian flag, was boarded
by officers of the French frigate Florialon September 28, 1999, in the EEZ of the French
' United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signatureDec. 10, 1982, Art. 7, 1833 UNTS 397,
reprintedin 21 ILM 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOS Convention].
The facts are summarized in paras. 25-29 of the Tribunal's decision, The "Camouco" (Pan. v. Fr.),Judgment,
ITLOS Case No. 5 (Feb. 7,2000) [hereinafterJudgment]. TheJudgment, alongwith the other case documents cited
in this report, are available online at<http://wwv.un.org/Depts/los/rILOS/5Camouco.htn>. Where no paragraph
numbers appear in an opinion or in the verbatim records, references are to page numbers as they appear in the text
downloaded from the Web site by the authors. The page numbers are included for convenience and are not
necessarily exact.
'Article 292(2) of the Convention authorizes applications for release "by or on behalf of" the flag state. The
application was filed "on behalf of Panama" by a Spanish attorneywho had been authorized by Panama to do so,
although it was accompanied by a communication from the Embassy of Panama in Brussels appointing that
attorney as "Agent of Panama." The same attorney represented the owners of the vessel in the French courts. See
Judgment, supra note 2, para. 2; Verbatim Record (Application for Prompt Release) (Jan. 27, 2000), Doc.
ITLOS/PV.00/1, at 5 [hereinafter Verbatim Record I]. The fact that the application was filed by the owner's
attorney "on behalf of" rather than "by" Panama suggests particular caution in attributing to Panama any
interpretations of the Convention and other legal arguments proffered to the Tribunal: this report, accordingly,
refers to the "applicant" and, in so doing, reflects the view that the Tribunal could have been more precise in
fashioning the title of the case-for example, by using the ex reL formulation used by many municipal courts. It
may be recalled that the alternative between filing applications "by" and "on behalf of" the flag state is afforded
by the Convention only in the context of Article 292 proceedings, and was a compromise with the views of those
who wished direct access in such proceedings by the owner or operator of the ship or representative of the crew.
SeeBernard H. Oxman, Observationson Vessel Release Underthe United NationsConvention on theLaw of the Sea, 11 INT'L
J. MARINE & CoAsTAL L. 201, 211-13 (1996).
'The majority consisted of President Chandrasekhara Rao, Vice-President Nelson, andJudges Zhao, Caminos,
Marotta Rangel,Yankov, Yamamoto, Kolodkin, Park, Bamela Engo, Mensah, Aid, Wolfrum, Laing, Treves, Marsit,
Eiriksson, Ndiaye, andJesus.Judges Anderson and Vukas dissented.Judgment, supra note 2, para. 78(3).
'Judges Kolodkin, Anderson, Vukas, Wolfium, Treves, and Ndiaye dissented. Id, para. 78(4).
'The applicant requested a translation into Spanish of the decision. The Tribunal did not accede to this request
because Spanish was not a language chosen by the parties in their pleadings. Id., para. 77; see Art. 64(4) of the
Rules of the Tribunal.
7 See infra notes 43-44.
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island of Crozet in the French Southern and Antarctic Territories.8 The officers said they
found about six tons of frozen toothfish in the hold. They stated that they observed the
Camouco letting out a longline over the side in the EEZ, that the Camouco did not reply to
calls from the frigate, and that it jettisoned documents and forty-eight bags. One bag
recovered by the French authorities contained thirty-four kilograms of fresh toothfish. The
procs-verbalof violation further stated that the Camouco's log revealed that it had previously
transited the EEZ of Crozet between July 5 and July 16, 1999, and that it had not been
authorized to do so. The master of the Camouco was accused of unlawful fishing in Crozet's
EEZ, failure to declare entry into the EEZ while having about six tons of frozen toothfish on
board, concealment of the vessel's markings while flying a foreign flag, and attempted flight.
The Camouco and its crew were escorted to the French island of R6union.
The master stated that he had been fishing south of Grozet's EEZ and then decided to
cross it in order to fish at a bank located north of the EEZ. He had faxed the vessel's
particulars on September 28 to French authorities but acknowledged that he forgot to fax
the particulars on entering the EEZ, even though he knew that French law required such
notice by fishing vessels carrying fish on board. He maintained that he never fished in
Crozet's EEZ and that he strictly adhered to his contract of employment, which provided
for fishing only on the high seas.9 As for the bag of fresh toothfish recovered by the French
authorities, the master said that he was not aware of the presence of any fresh toothfish
aboard his vessel and that the bags jettisoned by the crew contained rubbish."0
At the request of the public prosecutor, the master was charged on the basis of the earlier
procs-verbal of violation and placed under judicial supervision (contr6lejudidaire)" by the
examining magistrate (juge d'instruction) of the tribunal de grande instance at Saint-Denis,
Reunion. His passportwas taken away.12 On October 8, the chief magistrate of the tribunal d'instance of Saint-Paul, R~tmion, at the request of the Regional and Departmental Directorate of
Maritime Affairs, issued an order confirming the arrest of the Camoucoand ordering its release
upon the posting of a bond of twenty million francs in cash, certified check, or bank draft."
' The Camouco had left the Namibian port of Walvis Bay in September 1999 in order to engage in longline
fishing in the southern seas. At the time of the arrest, it was owned by Merce-Pesca (S.), a Panamanian corporation that was itself owned by two Spanish companies, Pesquera Mellon and Iminal Armadores. There were 29
crew members: 18, including the master, were Spanish nationals; 8 were Portuguese; 2, Chilean; and 1, Namibian.
The vessel held a fishing license issued by Panama to Merce-Pesca to fish for "Patagonian toothfish" on the high
seas in the South Atlantic.
BetweenJune 1998 andJuly 1999, the same vessel, then named the Saint-Jean,had been chartered byFrench operators and provisionally registered in the Kerguelen Islands under the French flag. At that time, it was licensed to fish
for toothfish in the French EEZ around Crozet, and also received a fishing license issued by French authorities under
the Convention on the Conservation ofAntarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) (May 21,1980,33 UST 3476).
There is no indication that the Camouco was arrested for fishing in the area to which CCAM1R applies. France
did notassert that itwas implementing CCAMLR conservation measures, but did note that illegal, unregulated, and
undeclared fishing in the EEZ, especially around Crozet, had disastrous consequences. See Verbatim Record,
(Application for Prompt Release) (Jan. 27,2000), Doc. 1TLOS/PV.00/2, at7 [hereinafter Verbatim Record II]. This
argument may explainJudge Wolfrum's complaint that "the Tribunal should have taken notice of the commonly
known fact that the fishing activities such as allegedly undertaken by the Camouco undermine the fishing regime
established under [CCArv.,R] and the conservation measures taken thereunder." Diss. Op. Wolfrum,J., para. 17.
It is not clear whether the Tribunal's failure to do so reflected concerns that such an analysis might invite inconclusive debate as to whether environmental protection or economic protectionism explains the enthusiastic
enforcement in question; allocation is the central issue in fisheries conservation.
' On Oct. 1,1999, the owners of the vessel sent a fax to the French Departmental Directorate of Maritime Affairs
and expressed their surprise at the presence of the vessel in the EEZ of Crozet. They stated that the captain violated
his instructions by entering the EEZ, and apologized for the incident. SeeVerbatim Record I, supranote 3, Annex 15.
10See id., Annex 11.
" "Judicial supervision may be ordered by the investigating magistrate if the person under investigation faces
a penalty of imprisonment .... "Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 138 (authors' translation).
12 Except for four members who remained on board to see to the maintenance of the Camouco, the crew left
Reunion on Oct. 13, 1999. SeeJudgment, supranote 2, para. 34.
" The Regional and Departmental Directorate of MaritimeAffairs estimated thevalue of thevessel at 20 million
francs, although there is no record of any survey. The value of the cargo was estimated at 380 thousand francs, It
was decided that the catch itself (7,600 kg. of toothfish) would be sold as provided by French law. See id., para. 69;
Verbatim Record I, supranote 3, Annex 16.
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Following a request for urgent proceedings filed by the master and the ship owner in the
tribunal d'instance of Saint-Paul, on December 14 the same chief magistrate confirmed his
decision of October 8.14 The owners had alleged that France violated Article 73(4) of the
Convention by failing to promptly notify the flag state. Noting that the value of the vessel
did not exceed 5,775,000 francs, they asserted that the required bond was ludicrous (faramineuse)
and asked the court to reduce it to 4,000,000 francs. 15 Failing such reduction, they warned
that they would seek recourse to the Tribunal under Article 292 of the Convention. The
chief magistrate ignored the allegations concerningviolation of the Convention and declined
to explain the basis upon which the bond was calculated." On December 23, 1999, the
master appealed to the Cour d'appel of Saint-Denis. That appeal was pendingwhen the application for release was filed with the Tribunal.
France argued that the applicant was estopped from applying to the Tribunal because it
had waited more than three months, rather than applying to the Tribunal soon after the
expiry of the ten-day period specified in Article 292. Among other things, the applicant
replied that the decision to file an application at the international level was made only when
the results of the domestic proceedings in R6union finally revealed that no release would be
granted. 17 The Tribunal concluded that Article 292
does not require the flag State to file an application at any particular time after the
detention of a vessel or its crew... It does not suggest that an application not made to
a court or tribunal within the 10-dayperiod or to the Tribunal immediately after the 10day period will notbe treated as an application for "prompt release" within the meaning
of article 292.1'
Article 292(3) specifies that a tribunal "shall deal only with the question of release." On
these grounds, France successfully challenged the admissibility of allegations that it violated:
Article 73 (3), which precludes imprisonment for fisheries violations; Article 73 (4), which
requires prompt notice to the flagstate of detention and other actions taken; and provisions
relating to freedom of navigation in the EEZ and to abuse of rights. 19
14SeeVerbatim Record I, supranote 3, Annex 21.
5See id., Annex 19. In its response, the Regional and Departmental Directorate for Maritime Affairs concluded

that the defendant did not have standing to invoke Article 73(4). As regards the bond, the directorate relied on
the French text of Article 73(2) of the Convention and considered a 20 million franc bond to be suffsante.Id.,
Annex 20; see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
In his reasoning, the chief magistrate noted:
Attendu qu'il appartient aujuge saisi de fixer le cautionnement par application des r gles fix6es a l'article
142 du Code de proc6dure p6nale; qu'il n'apas Arendre compte des 616ments sur lesquels il s'estfond6 pour
l]a fois garantir le paiement des p6nalit6s encourues et garantir la repr6sentation des pr6venus enjustice,
eu 6gard a Ia nature des faits.
Verbatim
Record I, supranote 3, Annex 21. SeeJudgment, supra note 2, para. 42.
7
Although the point was not raised in the proceedings, it is possible that some of the Panamanian officials
whose opinions might have been sought before authorizing an application for vessel release to an international
tribunal were preoccupied during the fall of 1999 with preparations for the assumption of full control over the
Panama Canal at the end of the year.
"8 Judgment, supranote 2, para. 54.
Id., paras. 59-60. French law requires fishingvessels entering the EEZ of the French Southern and Antarctic
Territories to indicate their presence and declare to the district head of the closest islands what tonnage of fish
they have on board. Failure to do so is punishable by a fine of one million francs or a prison sentence of six.
months, or both. Art. 4 of Law No. 66-400 ofJune 18,1966, as amended by Law No. 97-1051 of Nov. 18,1997;J.O.
ofJune 21, 1966, at 5035;J.O. of Nov. 19, 1997, at 16723; seeJudgment, supranote 2, para. 39.
The underlying question is whether such measures violate the freedom of navigation in the EEZ guaranteed
by Article 58 of the Convention, particularly since the elaborate provisions ofArticles 61 to 73 of the Convention
regarding coastal state rights to regulate fishing in the EEZ say nothing about prior notification of entry into the
EEZ. Revealing something less than intimate familiarity with the Convention, the application in its challenge to
these measures incorrectly referred to the right of innocent passage in the EEZ. SeeVerbatim Record I, supranote
3, para. 92. Even more surprisingly, the application conceded thatimposing afine (and notmerely an evidentiary
presumption) for failure to advise of entry into an EEZ seemed normal and may form part of the means a coastal
state has to control access to its EEZ. The application merely asserted that the fine itself was disproportionate. See
id., para. 99. In addition, the application deemed itan abuse of rightto establish an irrebuttable presumption that,
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France also argued that although the master was under judicial supervision, he was not
strictly in detention."0 Moreover, he had not filed a request for the lifting ofjudicial supervision before the international proceedings had been instituted. 1 The applicant noted that
the investigating magistrate rejected the master's request for release from judicial supervision on the same day it was made. 2 The Tribunal accepted the applicant's view:
It is admitted that the Master is presently under court supervision, that his passport
has also been taken away from him by the French authorities, and that, consequently,
he is not in a position to leave Reunion. The Tribunal considers that, in 23the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to order the release of the Master.
Although France did not assert that exhaustion of local remedies under Article 295 was
required before an application for release could be considered under Article 292, it
challenged the admissibility of the application on grounds of lis pendens, noting that the
purpose of the appeal pending in the French courts was to achieve the same result as that
sought before the Tribunal, namely, to overturn the decision of the tribunal d'instance of
Saint-Paul rendered on October 8, 1999.24 The Tribunal disagreed. Recalling that Article
292 proceedings are without prejudice to the merits of the case in the domestic forum, the
Tribunal considered it illogical to read into Article 292 the requirement of exhaustion of
local remedies or any other analogous rule.25
Article 73 of the Convention deals with coastal state enforcement of its fisheries regulations
in the EEZ. Paragraph 2 of that article provides, "Arrested vessels and their crews shall be
promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security." Article 226(1)
absent notice of entry into the EEZ, all the fish found on board the Camouco were deemed to have been caught
in the French EEZ.
In its Statement in Response, France did not address the consistency with the Convention of the notification
requirements and related presumptions of French law. During the oral proceedings, however, the French agent
noted thatFrench lawdid notestablish an irrebuttable presumption, buta simple presumption, the effectofwhich
was to shift the burden of proof. Verbatim Record II, supra note 8, at 11.
' SeeVerbatim Record I, sura note 3, Annex 17. The bond ordered by the French court related only to release
of the vessel. See Art. 3 of Law No. 84-582 ofJuly 5, 1983; J.O. ofJuly 6, 1983, at 2065. French statutes do not
provide for compulsory bail of an individual placed under judicial supervision. Under French lav, judicial
supervision is different from, and does not entail, provisional detention pending trial. See Code of Criminal
Procedure, Art. 144. Although a person underjudicial supervision maybe required to surrender a passport or post
security, the person is not thereby released from judicial supervision. See Code of Criminal Procedure, Art.
138(11). The result is similar to that which might obtain in other systems where a foreign defendant is released
pending trial on condition that he remain within the jurisdiction and surrender his passport.
"1According to Article 140 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, release from judicial supervision may
be ordered at any time by the investigating magistrate, whether sui sponte, on motion of the public prosecutor, or
upon request of the person concerned (the court having received the opinion of the public prosecutor).
' Verbatim Record I, supranote 3, at 22.
'Judgment,
supranote 2, para. 71.
24 SeeVerbatim Record II, supranote 8, at 14.
'Judgment, supranote 2, para. 57.
Article 292 provides for an independent remedy and not an appeal against a decision of a national court.
No limitation should be read into Article 292 that would have the effect of defeating its very object and
purpose. Indeed, Article 292 permits the making of an application within a short period from the date of
detention and it is not normally the case that local remedies could be exhausted in such a short period.
Id., para. 58. Prior to his election to the Tribunal,Judge Anderson stated that"itshould not be presumed thatArt.
295 is inapplicable, especially where a right of appeal is clearly a real possibility." David H. Anderson, Investigation,
Detention andRelease ofForeignVessels Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and Other International
Agreements, 11 INT'LJ. MARINE & COASTAL L. 165,170 (1996). Others disagreed at the time. See Oxman, supranote
3, at 210-11 ("[i]nsofar as vessel release proceedings are concerned, there is no lack of persuasive arguments that
Article 295 does not require exhaustion of local remedies ... and that other provisions of Part XV that might
frustrate or delay the proceedings are inapposite"). AlthoughJudge Anderson appears to have moderated hisview,
he still failed to see how waiting for the result of the appeal could defeat the object and purpose of Article 292
when an applicant seeks a reduction in the amount of the security prescribed on appeal just a few days before
seeking the same remedy from the Tribunal. Diss. Op. Anderson, J., at 2. Judge Vukas also disagreed with the
majority on the question of lispendens.In addition, he saw no reason for applying to the Tribunal one hundred
days after the detention. Diss. Op. VukasJ., paras. 5-7.
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contains a comparable provision with respect to vessels arrested for pollution violations.
Under Article 292, the Tribunal may be seized where "it is alleged that the detaining State
has not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel
or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security." In the English
text, the word reasonableis used consistently to refer to the legal standard for bond in the
three articles noted. Similarly, the Spanish text consistently uses the adjective razonable.
Although the French text ofArticles 226 and 292 uses the word raisonnable,26Article 73 (2)the very provision at issue here-uses the adjective suffisante.27 France did not, however, rely
on the word suffisante. The applicant noted this fact and declared that it was "sufficiently
clear that the word used in the Convention, and interpreted in this case, is 'reasonable' as
opposed to 'sufficient'. 28 The Tribunal did not address the issue; thejudgment uses reason29
able and raisonnable.
The applicant noted that neither the proc~s-verbalof seizure of October 7, 1999, nor the
order of the tribunal d'instance of Saint-Paul of October 8, 1999, provided any justification
for estimating the value of the vessel at 20 million francs. The order merely noted that this
amount was fixed "in the light of the value of the vessel and the penalties incurred." Moreover, in its order of December 14, the Saint-Paul tribunal expressly refused to elucidate the
basis for the bond. ° The applicant asserted that the sum of 20 million francs was unreasonable in light of the value of the vessel (which it estimated to be just under 3.5 million
francs) and its cargo (the fish had been sold by the French authorities for about 350 thousand
francs), and in light of the maximum fines for the offenses charged under French law (1
million francs, plus 500 thousand francs per ton in excess of two tons). In consideration of
the loss already sustained by the owners because of the vessel's detention, the applicant requested that the vessel and master be released without bond"1 or, alternatively, that the
security should comprise the 350 thousand francs received by France for the toothfish sold
plus a bond of 950 thousand francs.32 The applicant also requested that the bond be in the
form of a bank guarantee rather than the cash, bank check, or certified check required by
the French court.
France did not argue that the vessel was worth 20 million francs. Rather, it argued that the
required bond was reasonable in the light of the possible fines to be imposed on the master
26 In Articles 111 and 113 of the Rules of the Tribunal, the words reasonableand raisonnableare also used in this
context.
' The authentic texts of the Convention are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. Convention,
Art. 320. The words at issue are Latin-based cognates in English, French, and Spanish. According to Tarek Sayed,
the Arabic text uses the same word for reasonableinall three articles. Kuo-ching Pu tells the authors that the word
used in Chinese in Article 73 is different from the word used in both Articles 226 and 292, and that whereas the
latter is properly understood to mean reasonable, the former might better be understood to mean suitable Danil
Khvedtchik informed the authors that the Russian text of the three articles also contains inconsistencies on this
point, but the discrepancy is in Article 226 and may relate to the fact that the clause modified in that article is
"procedures such as bonding."
' Verbatim Record (Application for Prompt Release) (Jan. 28, 2000), Doc. ITLOS/PV.00/3, at 9 [hereinafter
Verbatim Record Il].
"Judge Anderson does invoke the French text. See Diss. Op. Anderson,J., at 5, quoted infranote 37.
oSee supranote 16.
2
,This pointwas ultimately dropped. The Tribunal had previously stated thatit could not "accede to the request
...that no bond or financial security (or only a 'symbolic bond') should be posted. The posting of a bond or
security seems to the Tribunal necessary in view of the nature of the prompt release proceedings." M/V "Saiga"
(St. Vincent v. Guinea), ITLOS Case No. 1 (Dec. 4, 1997), para. 81, <http://vivw.un.org/Depts/los/udgmentSaiga.htm>.
In this context, it might be borne in mind that the duty to release under Articles 73 and 226 applies even if the
arrest is lawful, and is expressly dependent upon the posting of bond or other financial security. Article 292
proceedings relate to this duty. The same considerations would not necessarily apply to a request for provisional
measures under Article 290-for example, in a case in which the right to arrest and detain is itself contested on
the merits. When a municipal court requires a party requesting provisional measures to post bond in a civil case,
the purpose is to balance the risks and costs of provisional measures to both parties. The context is differentwhen
questions of bail and bond arise in criminal cases, such as those addressed by Articles 73 and 226.
2 See Verbatim Record I, supra note 28, at 13.
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and also on the owners of the vessel in the event that legal proceedings were instituted against
them." The object of the bond was not simply to ensure the payment of fines, but also to
ensure appearance and the payment of any damages and interest. Moreover, a large bond
would have a deterrent effect in France's struggle against the theft of its resources.3 4 France
to that imposed in certain cases by
also claimed that the required amount was comparable
8 5
other coastal states in the Southern Hemisphere.
The issue was whether the required bond was reasonable "for the purposes of these
proceedings."36 In making this determination, the Tribunal took into account the gravity of
the alleged offense, the penalties imposed or imposable, the value of the vessel and its
cargo, and the amount of the bond required by the domestic court." Since no charges had
yet been made against the owners of the Camouco, however, the Tribunal did not take
account of the fines that might be imposed on them. The Tribunal noted that while there
was no evidence on record to substantiate the French authorities' assessment of the vessel's
value at 20 million francs, the applicant presented uncontroverted expert testimony that the
replacement value of the vessel was about 3.7 million francs.3 8 The Tribunal concluded that
"the bond of 20 million EF imposed by the French court is not 'reasonable'." 9 It decided
that a bond or other security in the amount of 8 million francs40 should be posted with
France 4 and, unless otherwise agreed, should be in the form of a bank guarantee. 2
On March 21, 2000, the civil chamber of the Cour d'appel of Saint-Denis considered the
appeal of the order of December 14. Expressly quoting the obligation of the authorities of
the detaining state to comply with the decision of the Tribunal underArticle 292(4) of the
Convention, the Cour d'appel ordered release of the vessel in light of the posting of the
bank guarantee of 8 million francs as prescribed by the Tribunal.43 The Panamanian agent
" France explained that the maximum fine that may be imposed upon the master was 5.5 million francs, and
that the maximum fine that may be imposed upon the owner as ajuridical person was 25 million francs (under
French law, five times the amount that might be imposed upon a natural person).
' Verbatim Record II, supranote 8, at 17.
3
Id.at 16.
sJudgment, supranote 2, para. 65.
-7Id., para. 67.Judge Laing believed that the Tribunal should determine a proper international standard and
should not seek to enforce the domestic laws of the detaining state. Decl. LaingJ., at 2.Judge Ndiaye was of the
view, however, that the laws and regulations of the coastal state are the point of reference for determining the
reasonableness of the bond. DecI. NdiayeJ. Invoking the French version ofArticle 73 (2),Judge Anderson wrote,
"What is 'reasonable' is an amountsuffisant/sufficienttocover penaltieswhich could be imposed upon conviction."
Diss. Op. Anderson,J., at 5. Accordingly, in his view the bond should have taken full account of the gravity of the
charges and the penalties imposable on the owners. Id.
ssJudgment, supranote 2, para. 69.
39Id., para. 70.
oId., para. 74.Judge Treves, although not defending the 20 million franc figure, believed that 8 million was
too low. Diss. Op. Treves,J., para. 9.Judge Wolfrum agreed, and complained that the majority did not give an
appropriate indication of the basis on which it assessed a bond set by national authorities. He believed that the
Convention does notimpose a limit on the size offines a coastal state may exact, and argued that the Tribunal had
impinged upon the enforcement rights ofFrance underArt. 73(1) bysetting a bond thatwas not even half ofwhat
was ordered by the French court. Diss. Op. Wolfrum,J., paras. 3, 6, 8, 16. It is not clear whether arty of thejudges
considered whether some limitation is implied by the authorization in Article 73 (1)to take such measures "as may
be necessary" to ensure compliance with laws and regulations thatmust themselves conform to substantive criteria
of the Convention, or by the prohibition on abuse of rights in Article 300, or, indeed, as a practical if not legal
matter, by the requirement that the ship and crew be released promptly on bond thatmust be reasonable and that,
if contested, can be set quickly by an international tribunal pursuant to a new international procedure. Of tie
weaknesses that might be discerned among those who participated actively in the negotiation of the Convention,
nalvet6 is not the most obvious.
41
CitingArt. 113(3) of its Rules, the Tribunal denied the applicant's request that the bond should be posted
with the Tribunal, to be delivered to France.
42
Judge Anderson did not consider it unreasonable for the French court to have ordered the security to be
provided in cash. Diss. Op. AndersonJ, at 6.
4
Soci~t6 Merce-Pesca SA v. Etat frangais, Judgment of Mar. 21, 2000, CA Saint-Denis, ch. civ., Case No.
267/2000 (on file with authors).
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informed the Tribunal on March 23 that the vessel had been released the previous day, and
on March 24 that the master's passport had been returned. 44

In its second prompt-release case, the Tribunal once again demonstrated its capacity for swift
action. In these cases, the Tribunal is, quite rightly, functioning primarily as an efficient and
effective adjudicator of petitions to be set free in the most literal sense, and properly continues
to resist the invitation to give primacy to formulating finely framed dictum explicated in extenso.
Those who argue that the outcomes of cases often reflect the substantive predispositions
of the judges' states of nationality will again be surprised by the Tribunal: the decision
reveals substantially the opposite of what those so inclined might have expected in a case
challenging a bond fixed by the coastal state in a fisheries arrest. The majority included most
judges from countries that might be regarded as particularly sympathetic to coastal state
claims to discretionary control over fisheries, whereas the dissent included judges from
European (but notAsian) countries that are at times more restrained about such claims. In
addition, it can be argued that regional factors were irrelevant because the dispute was in
substance between France and a Spanish fishing company.45
The Tribunal adopted a balanced approach that neither requires nor discourages exhaustion of local remedies in the context of prompt-release proceedings under Article 292.
As in the instant case, one may await the outcome in municipal trial courts and even file a
timely appeal of that outcome to a higher municipal court, without prejudice to the right
of the flag state to petition the Tribunal for release at any time after the ten-day waiting
period. The Tribunal correctly concluded that a compulsory delay to await the outcome of
a pending appeal in a municipal court would defeat the purpose of Article 292. Indeed, that
article expressly commands the Tribunal to proceed "without delay."
Suspending the right of the flag state to petition the Tribunal for release while municipal
court proceedings are pending could, by forcing a choice, have the perverse effect of discouraging full use of local remedies; the ultimate effect might even be to preclude use of local
remedies if, for example, the time limit for filing an appeal in municipal court were to
expire before the Tribunal rendered its decision. It could also have the odd effect of permitting attorneys for private parties in municipal court, perhaps because of a difference in
priorities or strategy, to frustrate a decision by a flag state to seek prompt release in an international forum. This merely serves to illustrate the reasons for doubting that the situation
presented is one of lispendensatall. Both the parties and the issues before a municipal court,
even in a dispute over bond, are not necessarily the same as those before an international
tribunal.4" In the instant case, whatever the status of treaties under French municipal law, it
is clear that the French courts were applying French statutes-which, indeed, is their duty-in
proceedings to which Panama was not party.
In cases challenging the amount of bond fixed by a municipal court, an underlying issue
concerns the municipal judge's scope of discretion in applying municipal law when that
samejudge (or at least the state) is also bound to complywith a standard set forth in a supervening international instrument, in this case a less than fully determinate standard of
' Letters of March 23, 2000, and March 24, 2000, from the agent of Panama to the registrar of the Tribunal (on
file with authors).
' Some skeptics might argue, however, that the case was brought on behalf of Panama, not Spain, and that all
the judges from the European Union dissented on the central issue of the amount of the bond. Even so, the
disagreement ofJudge Treves and perhapsJudge Wolfrum with the dispositifseemsto be over a relatively small
difference in the amount. See Diss. Op. TrevesJ., para. 9; Diss. Op. Wolfrum,J., para. 8.
" The International Court of'Justice has pointed out that an international tribunal applies different law to differentparties evenwhen, in essence, the same claim had been made before a domestic court. SeeElettronica Sicula
S.P.A. (Elsi) (U.S. v. Italy),Judgment, 1989 ICJ REP. 13, para. 59.
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reasonableness. But unlike a few dissenters, the Tribunal seems to have viewed the issue
here not so much as one of wondering how much deference is due the municipal judge's
appreciation of the Convention's criteria in the context of this case, but as one of determining whether the municipal judge applied the Convention at all.
Although treaties prevail over statutes under French law,47 and the public prosecutor, as
well as the master and the owner, referred to the Convention in their submissions, the chief
magistrate of the tribunal d'instance had nothing to say about the Convention or his
reasoning thereunder. Instead, he expressly declined to indicate his reasoning even under
French statutes, recalling that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is for thejudge to
set the bond, and he is not required to give an account of the considerations on which he
based his decision. 8 It would appear that the judge was either unaware of, or unmoved by,
the need to ensure compliance with the Convention's requirement of reasonable bond or,
for that matter, the practical desirability-in a case that might well be considered by an
international tribunal-of affording the latter tribunal some basis for understanding, and
49
therefore deferring to, the reasoning of the municipal court.

The Tribunal's opinion reflects the view that the Convention's requirements and standards
for bonding are autonomous and do not depend on municipal law.5" Its decision to order
release of the master, whose passportwas taken butwho was notinjail, reflects the view that
release on bond under the Convention includes freedom to leave the country. These views,
in turn, reflect an informed understanding of the purpose of the Convention's provisions
regarding release on bond. 1 Although the opinion failed to reveal precisely how the amount
of the bond was determined, the Tribunal did identify the factors it took into account, and
may well identify additional criteria in future cases in light of their particular facts. What
constitutes "reasonable" bond is a highly fact-specific issue.5" The question is whether the
end result in a given context reasonably balances the right to prompt release with the right
to try and punish.53
47

CONST., Art. 55; seeAdministration des Douanes c. Soci6t6 "Caf6sJacques Vabre,"Judgment of May 24, 1975,
at 497, Cass. ch. mixte, 1975 Bull. Civ. IV, No. 4, D. 1975,JCP 1975 II; In reNicolo, Decision of Oct. 20, 1989, D.
1990,
135,JCP III, No. 21, at 371 (1989), 25 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europ6en 786 (1989).
48
See supranote 16. This conclusion is not obvious under French law. "M6connait l'art. 142 Ia d6cision qui se
borne a ordonner un cautionnement sans pr6cision de son affectation."Judgment of Oct. 13, 1988, Cass. crim.,
1988 Bull. Crim., No. 257. Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
When the person under investigation is required to furnish security, such security guarantees: (1). The
appearance of the accused, whether charged or not, at all stages of the proceedings and for the execution
ofjudgment, as well as, where appropriate, the execution of other obligations which have been imposed
upon him. (2) ... Payment, in the following order of: (a). reparation of damages caused by the offense and
restitution... (b). fines. The decision that compels the defendant to furnish security shall determine the
sums assigned to each of the two parts of the security.
In the latter case, "ce montant et ces d6lals doivent 6tre fix6s compte tenu notamment des ressources de
l'inculp6." Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 138 (11).
" Some dissenting judges referred to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in according a
margin of appreciation to municipal authorities. See Diss. Op. Anderson,J., at 1 (national courts should be accorded a broad margin of appreciation); Diss. Op. Wolfrum, J., para. 14 (the Tribunal should restrict itself to
ascertainingwhether the decision of the national courtwas unlawful under international law, orarbitrary, ormade
in bad faith). The analogy is not fully developed; in at least some respects, it may be inapposite. Moreover, the
European Court takes care that the margin is not"excessive." SeeLetelierv. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1991.
' Thus, for example, the Tribunal did not order that the bond be in the form of cash or a certified or bank check,
notwithstanding the requirements of French law. See Code of Criminal Procedure, Arts. R.19-.23;Judgment of
Apr. 23,1991, Cass. crim., 1991 Bull. Crim., No. 191 ("le cautionnementne peut 6tre vers6 que par cheque certifiM
ou en esp~ces").
51 See supra note 20.
52

Vice-President Nelson considered that what is reasonable and equitable must depend on the particular circumstances of the case (citing Interpretation of the Agreement of Mar. 25, 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt,
Advisory Opinion, 1980 ICJ REP. 73, para. 49 (Dec. 20)). Sep. Op. Nelson, V.P., at 2.
' In another context, see Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan ArabJamahirya), Judgment, 1982 ICJ REp. 18,
paras. 70-71 (Feb. 24): "Itis,however, the resultwhich is predominant; the principles are subordinate to the goal.
... While it is clear that no rigid rules exist as to the exact weight to be attached to each element in the case, this
is very far from being an exercise of discretion."
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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS

In the United States, state courts have long been aware that well-reasoned decisions evaluating the state interests that must be taken into account in determining the scope of federally protected rights can help to elicit deference to state law from the U.S. Supreme Court.
Municipal courts in Europe are also learning that well-reasoned decisions are more likely
to elicit deference from regional international tribunals, be itin the context of the principle
of subsidiarity in the European Community or in the context of the margin of appreciation
under the European Convention on Human Rights. Ifnothing else, this case may help nurture
a similar attitude in municipal courts generally, at least with respect to treaty obligations that
54
may well be invoked before an international tribunal with compulsoryjurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the delay in instituting proceedings in the present case, the need for
urgency in prompt-release cases makes it likely that only the decision of a municipal trial
court, and not that of an appellate court, will ordinarily be available at the time the Tribunal
is seized. Although trial courts are accustomed to the idea that their decisions will be
reviewed, they are also accustomed to the considerable freedom afforded them by appellate
courts on certain matters. It is likely that appellate courts, once they articulate the relevant
considerations and standards, only episodically manifest an interest in fact-sensitive "trial
management" matters such as bond. The underlying point of this case is that the Tribunal
is not a municipal appellate court applying municipal law.
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ERITREA-YEMEN ARBITRATION (AWARD, PHASE II: MARITIME DELIMITATION). Obtainablefrom

<http://www.pca-cpa.org>.
Arbitral Tribunal, December 17, 1999.
On December 17,1999, theArbitral Tribunal (Tribunal), convoked byEritrea andYemen
in the Arbitration Agreement of October 3, 1996, and comprisingJudges Rosalyn Higgins
and Stephen Schwebel, appointed byEritrea, Dr. Ahmed E1-Kosheri and the late Keith Highet,
appointed by Yemen, and Sir RobertJennings, presiding, delivered the second award in a
process that the parties had elected to conduct in two stages. In the first stage, the Tribunal
addressed territorial sovereignty and the scope of the dispute.' The second and final award,
reviewed here, addressed maritime delimitation. Unfortunately, the pleadings have not
been published, and the student must rely on the Tribunal's brief summaries of them.
' The absence of transparencyis again raised with reference to ajudicial opinion, albeit this time to decry a lack
of adequate reasoning in the decision of the municipal court, rather than in the Tribunal'sJudgment. See Diss.
Op. Wolfrum,J., para. 16; M/V "Saiga," supranote 31, Sep. Op. Wolfrum, V.P., para. 2, <http://wvw.un.org/
Depts/los/ITLOS/SO.SagaWolfrum.htm>. It might be noted in this regard that a reasoned judicial opinion
is not necessarily the same thing as a transparent one. Consider, for example, the classically concise style of French
decisions. Some courts, such as the European Court ofJustice, give no indication of dissent and do not publish
separate or dissenting opinions. Even courts that write voluminous majority and dissenting opinions are not
immune to suspicions of a lack of candor. The rarity of complaints about the confidentiality ofjudicial deliberations following public proceedings suggests that transparency in the reasoning process itself is not necessarily
regarded as desirable. It maybe noted thatArticle 42 of the Rules of the Tribunal, based on Article 21 of the Rules
of Court of the International Court ofJustice, specifies that the deliberations of the Tribunal "shall take place in
private and remain secret" and that the "records of the Tribunal'sjudicial deliberations shall contain only the titie
or nature of the subjects or matters discussed and the results of any vote taken" and "shall not contain any details
of the discussions nor the views expressed, provided however that anyjudge is entitled to require that a statement
made by him be inserted in the records."
' The author reported on the first stage in 93 AJIL 668 (1999).

